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ABSTRACT
From its birth, administrative law has claimed a close connection to governmental practice. Yet as administrative law has grown and matured it has
moved further away from how agencies actually function. The causes of administrative law’s disconnect from actual administration are complex and the
divide is now longstanding, but it is also a source of concern given the increasing importance of internal administration for ensuring accountable government. This Article analyzes the contemporary manifestations and historical
origins of administrative law’s divide from public administration, as well as
the growing costs of this disconnect. It also describes the Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”)’s exceptional status as the rare forum
spanning the worlds of both administrative law and public administration, and
the critical role ACUS can play in reasserting linkages between these two critical dimensions of government.
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INTRODUCTION
A funny thing happened to administrative law in the United
States over the course of the twentieth century. Administrative law
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emerged as a field at the century’s beginning, in response to the
growth in national administrative government.1 The 1946 enactment
of the Administrative Procedure Act2 (“APA”), following an intensive
study of different federal agencies’ practices, represented an acknowledgement that the administrative state was here to stay.3 Subsequent
administrative law transformations have also been tied to changes in
how agencies operate. For example, the expansion in the procedural
requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking followed agencies’
increased use of such rulemaking.4 Centralized regulatory review and
other forms of presidential direction, perhaps the most significant administrative developments of the last few decades, are a core part of
administrative law casebooks and scholarship.5
In short, from its birth, administrative law has claimed a close
connection to governmental practice.6 But, in fact, as administrative
law has grown and matured, it has moved further away from critical
aspects of how agencies function.7 As many have noted, administrative law focuses almost entirely on external dimensions of administrative action, and the external dimensions it targets are increasingly not
the main drivers of administrative action.8 To be sure, courts police
1 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1671–72 (1975); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3–17 (2012)
(noting the conventional view that administrative organization and administrative law came into
being at the national level in the late nineteenth century, but arguing that both have actually
existed since the nation’s founding).
2 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5
U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012)).
3 For a detailed history of the APA’s enactment, see George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV.
1557 (1996). See also Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72
VA. L. REV. 219, 224–29 (1986) (describing the work of the Attorney General’s Committee on
Administrative Procedure).
4 See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1300 & n.26 (2012). New statutes mandating use of rulemaking and imposing new procedural requirements, such as the Clean Air Act, also played a significant role.
5 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 485–91 (2003) (describing the presidential control
model in administrative and constitutional law scholarship); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2281–319 (2001) (describing different forms of presidential
administration and their increasing importance); see also Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Comment,
Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and Some Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA.
L. REV. 1135, 1136–37 (2008) (documenting a dramatic rise in legal scholarship related to costbenefit analysis, the key component of centralized regulatory review).
6 See infra Part I.B.
7 Id.
8 See infra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.
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agency conformity with procedural requirements imposed by the
APA, other statutes and regulations, and constitutional due process,
but these legal mandates govern only a small part of agency operations.9 Courts insistently exclude more systemic aspects of agency
functioning from their purview and from administrative law doctrines.10 Key internal agency dynamics—such as planning, assessment,
oversight mechanisms and managerial methods, budgeting, personnel
practices, reliance on private contractors, and the like—are left instead to public administration. As a result, despite their common concern with administrative agencies, the fields of administrative law and
public administration interact largely as passing strangers, acknowledging each other’s existence but almost never engaging in any sustained interchange.
The causes of administrative law’s separation from public administration are complex and rooted in historical field development, ideological commitments, institutional role, constitutional principle, and
good old-fashioned turf protection. This separation reflects administrative law’s traditional court-centric focus, and much can be said for
keeping the courts out of the internal world of agency functioning.
Yet administrative law’s growing disconnect from actual government
practices is cause for concern. This disconnect perpetuates a false image of how agencies operate and the role of internal administration.
In a number of contexts internal administration is the linchpin for ensuring accountable government, particularly given the obstacles to external constraint through congressional oversight or judicial review.11
Moreover, whether intentional or not, administrative law affects internal agency operations in significant ways. Hence, administrative law’s
inattention to public administration risks impeding development of
good administrative practices and worse, incentivizes agencies to
adopt bad ones, at a time when the importance of strong internal administration is only growing.
Enter ACUS. Although the separation of administrative law
from public administration is longstanding, there have been rare instances of linkage between the two. ACUS represents one such instance. Not only does its membership bridge the internal-external
9 See Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 96–97, 105–11 (2003); see also William H. Simon, The Organizational
Premises of Administrative Law, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 61–63, 70–74 (2015).
10 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836,
1859–73 (2015).
11

See id. at 1849–59.
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divide, consisting of agency officials and public members from outside
of government, but the projects it undertakes also span the worlds of
administrative law and public administration. ACUS is thus ideally
situated to address the growing disconnect between these two fields,
studying how administrative law affects internal agency operations
and assessing whether—and how—administrative law might be used
to improve public administration.
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION DIVIDE
Administrative law and public administration scholars both bemoan the disconnect between their fields, a disconnect evident
through a comparison of key agency internal practices and administrative law doctrines. The historical roots of this divide trace back to
both fields’ origins in the United States at the outset of the twentieth
century. But over time the divide has expanded and become entrenched, based today more expressly on separation of powers principles, concerns about the impact of judicial review on agency
functioning, and the dominance of managerialist approaches to public
administration.
A. Manifestations of the Administrative Law-Public Administration
Divide
At first glance, the claim that administrative law is divorced from
how agencies actually function seems patently false. After all, a core
focus of the APA—the nation’s most foundational administrative law
enactment—is agency process, setting out basic procedural requirements for agencies to follow.12 Federal courts in turn have penned an
endless number of administrative law decisions interpreting those requirements, and learning the details of the resultant doctrines is one
of the joys experienced by many a student of administrative law.
Moreover, study of centralized White House regulatory review, implemented through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and a central factor today in major rulemaking, is another administrative law
staple.13 In addition, administrative law scholars increasingly are turning their attention to important internal dynamics that shape how
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–557 (2012).
See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES
AND COMMENTS 213–41, 685–89 (11th ed. 2011) (detailing instances of presidential direction and
review as well as connected scholarship); see also Kagan, supra note 5.
12
13
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agencies operate, such as an agency’s internal organization and design
or the use of multiple agencies to implement a regulatory scheme.14
Yet, appearances can be deceiving. A key feature of the APA is
that it represents external controls, imposed by statute and elaborated
on by courts. Process requirements developed by agencies themselves
rarely rise to the fore in administrative law, except with respect to
whether those requirements are judicially enforceable.15 Despite their
central importance to how federal agencies function today, centralized
regulatory review and presidential direction remain remarkably absent from administrative law decisions.16 The same is true of other
significant internal agency features, such as priority-setting and planning processes or the role of career officials in agency decisionmaking.17 Perhaps the clearest evidence of this doctrinal absence is
offered by Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,18 where the Supreme
Court ruled it lacked jurisdiction over a challenge to the Bureau of
Land Management’s failure to undertake programmatic and planning
activities with respect to public lands.19 According to the Court, such
activities were too “wholesale” or systematic to come within the scope
of judicial review, which it deemed limited to discrete agency actions.20 In a subsequent decision the Court tied this exclusion even
more firmly to the terms of the APA’s grant of jurisdiction,21 but it has
also sometimes held that general or programmatic challenges are
barred on constitutional standing grounds.22
14 See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012) (detailing and analyzing interagency coordination); Jacob E.
Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
333 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (discussing public choice theory
and issues of agency design); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional
Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422 (2011) (discussing the effects of legal-institutional design
choices on government decisionmakers’ incentives to invest in information).
15 See Elizabeth Magill, Foreword: Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859,
860–61, 873–91 (2009); see also STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 13, at 203–07, 926–34 (describing
internal agency processes connected to rulemaking and with respect to judicial review).
16 See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1138–39, 1155–57 (2014); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for
Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 7, 18–23 (2009).
17 See Rubin, supra note 9, at 97; Sidney A. Shapiro, Why Administrative Law Misunderstands How Government Works: The Missing Institutional Analysis, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 10–13,
23–24 (2013); Simon, supra note 9, at 74–79.
18 Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
19 Id. at 891–94.
20 Id.
21 See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 61–67 (2004).
22 See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759–60
(1984).
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Increasingly administrative law scholars are arguing that exclusion of these systemic internal features is separating administrative
law from the main drivers of agency functioning. According to these
scholars, classical or canonical administrative law—defined generally
as “the text and judicial interpretations of the APA and associated
constitutional doctrine. . . does not reach some of the most practically
important official conduct”23 and “can seem like a minor presence in
the modern regulatory process.”24 William Simon argues that administrative law traditionally emphasizes top-down, bureaucratic delegations and specific acts of rulemaking.25 Simon further contends that
this approach not only leaves vast areas of agency discretion unregulated, but also is at odds with contemporary models of administration,
which focus on overall planning and monitoring and derive legitimacy
from transparency and processes for continuous revision.26 Dan Farber and Anne O’Connell agree that current administrative law is premised on a “lost world,” one in which a statutorily authorized agency
implements statutory requirements, following mandated procedures
and undertaking reasoned consideration of both the requirements and
evidence before the agency, with the agency’s determination subsequently reviewable by courts.27 “The reality of the modern administrative state,” however, is quite different: executive directives as well
as statutory requirements are in play; multiple agencies (often lacking
confirmed leaders) are charged with implementation, yet in practice
authority may rest elsewhere, in particular in the hands of OIRA and
White House staff; mandated procedures are avoided; political, as opposed to statutory, factors drive decisionmaking; and little judicial
oversight is available.28
Edward Rubin takes the argument even further, contending that
“the APA was out of date at the time it was enacted” because its requirements “are derived from an essentially judicial concept of governance in which laws are discovered rather than invented and policy
making is always incremental,” thereby ignoring the distinctive features of the administrative process and leaving key activities “such as
priority setting, resource allocation, research, planning, targeting, guidance, and strategic enforcement” either “essentially unregulated or
23

Simon, supra note 9, at 62, 64.

24

Farber & O’Connell, supra note 16, at 1138.

R
R

25

See Simon, supra note 9, at 63–92.

R

26

Id.

27

Farber & O’Connell, supra note 16, at 1154.

28

Id. at 1154–73.
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subject[ed] . . . to inappropriate procedural rigidities.”29 Like Rubin,
Sidney Shapiro faults administrative law for failing to heed the insights of public administration.30 In Shapiro’s view, administrative law
is excessively focused on “outside-in accountability,” specifically political and legal controls external to an agency, and ignores the ways that
“hierarchy . . . institutional norms, and professionalism promote accountability from inside an agency.”31 Jerry Mashaw puts the point
particularly well:
[W]e tend to think of our administrative constitution as a set
of external constraints on agencies. . . . [and] relentlessly analyze these external constraints as if they were the major determinants of agency efficiency, procedural fairness, and
legal legitimacy. Yet in many ways it is the internal law of
administration—the memoranda, guidelines, circulars, and
customs within agencies that most powerfully mold the behavior of administrative officials.32
Strikingly, some public administration scholars also critique the
disconnect between administrative law and public administration.
But, they approach this disconnect from the opposite direction, faulting their field for its refusal to take seriously the central role of public
law in public administration. Thus, Laurence Lynn critiques public
administration’s “anti-legal temper,”33 arguing that “a broad consensus within public administration appears to hold that law is one of
many environmental constraints on administrative discretion rather
Rubin, supra note 9, at 96–97.
Shapiro, supra note 17, at 1.
31 Id. Note that although these scholars agree that administrative law fails to encompass
key dimensions of modern administration, they take somewhat different stances on the specific
features of this mismatch. In particular, whereas Simon argues that current administrative law is
too bureaucratic and hierarchical in its focus and Farber and O’Connell describe it as failing to
acknowledge the role of presidential and executive branch directives, Shapiro’s complaint is that
administrative law does not give hierarchy enough weight and is too focused on presidential
oversight. Compare Simon, supra note 9, at 67–74, and Farber & O’Connell, supra note 16, at
1154–60, with Shapiro, supra note 17, at 11–25. See also Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright,
The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 577, 585–87 (2011) (detailing the benefits of bureaucratic control). This discrepancy may result from the fact that Shapiro is targeting administrative law scholarship somewhat
more than administrative law’s statutory and doctrinal manifestations, but in any event these
differences do not take away from their shared agreement that administrative law fails to acknowledge important internal administrative features that drive agency behavior.
32 MASHAW, supra note 1, at 313.
33 The phrase originated with DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY
OF THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 79 (1948). See Laurence E.
Lynn, Jr., Restoring the Rule of Law to Public Administration: What Frank Goodnow Got Right
and Leonard White Didn’t, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 803, 803 (2009).
29
30
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than its source” and gives “short shrift to the relationship between law
and administration.”34 Such dismissals of law are misguided not just
because of the myriad ways that law impinges on administration, but
also because “public administrators necessarily play an essential role
in defining what the rule of law means in practice.”35 Other public
administration scholars similarly contend that “the basic theory guiding governmental organization and management . . . is to be found in
public law” and bemoan that public administration orients itself
around management principles instead of public law.36
B. Historical Antecedents
The current divide between administrative law and public administration is not a new phenomenon, but dates back to when both fields
emerged as areas of academic study and practice at the beginning of
the twentieth century. Early scholars of administrative law disagreed
in fundamental ways about how the field should develop. Some, in
particular Frank Goodnow and Ernest Freund—both political scientists as well as legal academics—saw features of internal administration as a core part of administrative law’s ambit.37 Goodnow began
his 1905 treatise on administrative law with a disquisition on the
meaning of administration, along with an insistence on paying attention to how government actually operates:
Since administration and administrative law have to do with
the governmental system in operation, or, in other words,
with the actual operations of political life, it is absolutely
necessary that the study of these subjects take into account
not merely the formal governmental system as it is outlined
in charters of government and legal rules, but, as well, those
extralegal conditions and practices which, it has been shown,
34

Lynn, supra note 33, at 803.

R

Id. at 805, 808–09; see also ANTHONY M. BERTELLI & LAURENCE E. LYNN JR.,
MADISON’S MANAGERS: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 73 (2006) (“By ignoring [law], public administration contributes to its own powerlessness.”).
35

36 See Ronald C. Moe & Robert S. Gilmour, Rediscovering Principles of Public Administration: The Neglected Foundation of Public Law, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 135, 135–36 (1995); see
also Lynn, supra note 33, at 805–06 (quoting public administration scholars who emphasize public law).

See WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRAGOVERNMENT 47–59 (1982); Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the
Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 973
(2011).
37
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have such an important influence on the real character of
governmental systems.38
Goodnow followed this introduction with a detailed review of the
organization of administration, including the organization of executive
departments and chief executive authority, turning to judicial control
of administration only at the end.39 Freund, in turn, “sought to bridge
what he saw as the differentiated study of administrative organization
and administrative powers, the former of which focused on optimizing
internal public administration and the latter of which performed the
‘more strictly legal’ task of protecting ‘right and justice.’”40 Freund
was an advocate of greater external constraints on administrative discretion, in particular more detailed legislative specification to guide
agency decisionmaking. But he also expressly highlighted the potential benefits of internal administrative systems of control, which he
emphasized operate constantly on subordinate officers and—unlike
courts—can fully address questions of the wisdom and expediency of
discretionary action.41 Acknowledging the tendency to see “administrative law . . . [as] primarily judicial law controlling the administration,” he urged also applying the term “to a body of principles
produced by the administration” on the grounds that longstanding
“administrative practise [sic] has many of the characteristics of law.”42
Goodnow and Freund were not alone. Another leading early administrative law scholar, Bruce Wyman, framed his 1903 treatise
around a distinction between internal and external administrative law.
According to Wyman, “[e]xternal administrative law deals with the
relations of the administration or officers with citizens,” while
“[i]nternal administrative law is concerned with the relations of officers with each other, or with the administration.”43 Such a clear external-internal distinction could set the groundwork for downplaying
38 FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 5 (1905).
39 See generally id.; see also Mark Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”: Thurman
Arnold and the Making of Modern Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REV. 69, 77 (2005) (describing
Goodnow’s approach as “largely an internal one” that “focused less on common law development by the judiciary”).
40 Fenster, supra note 39, at 78 (quoting Ernst Freund, Administrative Law, in 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 452, 455 (Edwin R. A. Seligman ed., 1930)).
41 Ernst Freund, The Law of the Administration in America, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 403, 414–15,
419 (1894); see also Daniel R. Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter, and the American Rechtsstaat: A Transatlantic Shipwreck, 1894–1932, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 171, 175, 179 (2009).
42 Freund, supra note 40, at 454–55.
43 BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 4 (1903).

R
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the internal dimension—more hidden to begin with and less familiar
to lawyers than courts—in favor of the external.44 But Wyman expressly acknowledged the internal aspects of administration as part of
administrative law, insisting that “[t]ogether, the external law and the
internal law make up the law of administration.”45
By the late 1920s and early 1930s, when John Dickinson, Felix
Frankfurter, and John Davison penned their takes on administrative
law, this acknowledgement of internal administration as part of administrative law had largely disappeared.46 Courts were now ascendant. Dickinson’s volume, for example, contained detailed accounts
of the nature and importance of the courts in administrative action
with no discussion of topics unrelated to judicial review.47 According
to Thomas Merrill, Dickinson’s approach marked the adoption of a
new appellate model of judicial review, which extended the reach of
the courts into areas previously left to agency discretion.48 But it also
represented the seeming removal of questions that did not lend themselves to judicial involvement from administrative law’s ken—and
thus the internal organizational issues that engaged Goodnow,
Freund, and Wyman are notably absent.49 Frankfurter’s approach was
broader. He underscored the importance of internal administrative
features, such as “a highly professionalized civil service, an adequate
technique of administrative application of legal standards, [and] a
flexible, appropriate and economical procedure.”50 Frankfurter also
defined administrative law in encompassing terms: “administrative
law deals with the field of legal control exercised by law-administering
44

See CHASE, supra note 37, at 61–71.

WYMAN, supra note 43, at 4. Moreover, Wyman emphasized that the focus of internal
administrative law is administration, or the process and methods by which an administration acts
and its officers engage in common action. Id. at 14–15 (“The purpose of the law of administration . . . is the science of common action.”).
46 Jerry Mashaw has written eloquently about the importance of internal administrative
law and the limitations of a court-centered perspective. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 1.
47 See generally JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1927).
48 See Merrill, supra note 37, at 972–79.
49 Id. at 973. Merrill notes that despite Dickinson’s sole focus on the court-agency relationship “[q]uite likely, [he] had no intention of suggesting that there is nothing else to administrative law besides the issue of judicial review—this was simply what he chose to write about.”
Id.
50 Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 618 (1927);
see also id. at 620–21 (arguing that in-depth scientific study of how different agencies operate is a
central precondition for development of administrative law); Ernst, supra note 41, at 180–82
(describing series of “intensive studies” of federal agencies undertaken under Frankfurter’s supervision and supported by the Commonwealth Fund).
45

R
R

R
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agencies other than courts, and the field of control exercised by courts
over such agencies.”51 Yet, his and Davison’s casebook similarly excludes discussion of internal agency features in favor of an extensive
analysis of judicial controls on an agency-by-agency basis and materials on separation of powers.52
A few decades later, the identification of administrative law with
judicial review had intensified. To be sure, attention to internal administrative practice remained an important theme during the New
Deal period. James Landis famously defended the New Deal administrative state with an emphasis on administrative process and an argument for how agencies’ internal combination of different functions
made them far better equipped than the courts to address the major
problems of the day.53 The intensive study of agencies’ actual practices, which led to the enactment of the APA, demonstrated continued
concern with internal administrative operations.54 Moreover, the
post-New Deal period was one of significant deference to agencies
and restrained judicial scrutiny.55 Still, these developments did not
undermine the increasing identification of administrative law in terms
of external and, particularly, judicial controls.56 This is perhaps best
captured by the title of Louis Jaffe’s dominant treatise, Judicial Con51

Frankfurter, supra note 50, at 615.

See FELIX FRANKFURTER & J. FORRESTER DAVISON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS
ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ix (1932); see also CHASE, supra note 37, at 14–17 (describing Frankfurter’s definition of administrative law as “refer[ing] to what courts do in relation to administrative action”); J. F. Davison, Administration and Judicial Self-Limitation, 4 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
291, 296–99 (1936) (defining administrative law as “a body of principles followed by the regular
courts of law in deciding disputes as to the proper relationship between the three powers of
government or between an agency or bureau of the government and individual[s]” and arguing
that similar rules and principles were not yet available from agencies in formulating their decisions); Oliver P. Field, The Study of Administrative Law: A Review and a Proposal, 18 IOWA L.
REV. 233, 236 (1933) (“[Frankfurter and Davison’s casebook] is not a casebook on administrative law. . . . [I]t is a fine collection of cases on the separation and delegation of powers, and
judicial review of administrative action.”).

R

52

53

JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10–12, 24–46 (1938).

54

MASHAW, supra note 1, at 279.

R

R

See generally Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 429–40 (2007).
55

56 Merrill, supra note 37, at 973; see Fenster, supra note 39, at 82–84 (identifying the view
“that legal academic research and teaching should focus on the traditional study of the judicial
role in the administrative process—that is, on the limited judicial review of administrative agencies rather than on the bureaucratic operations and [decisionmaking] of the agencies themselves” as a “core assumption of early administrative law scholars” such as Dickinson,
Frankfurter, and Landis). Fenster identifies Thurman Arnold as an administrative law theorist
of this period who offered a model of administrative law that emphasized greater partnership
between administrators and courts. See id. at 103–11.
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trol of Administrative Action.57 Indeed, the APA arguably reinforced
this trend, with its imposition of trans-substantive procedural requirements that applied to all agencies and were to be enforced by courts.
Why the internal dimensions of administration were initially
dropped from administrative law is a complicated question, and one
that implicates forces that go beyond the field of administrative law.
William Chase traces early resistance to incorporating administration
to broader efforts by legal academia to systematize law teaching, particularly in the form of the Langdellian case method. According to
Chase, this case method “model was intensely committed to the study
and teaching of the work product of the traditional courts, and it was
just as intensely biased against the teaching of a topic like administrative law and . . . the study of the noncourt decisions which that topic’s
full scholarly development would require.”58 The valorization of
courts over administration also reflected a traditional common law
identification of the rule of law with judicial control. This identification and understanding of administrative law as exempting government officials from “the ordinary law of the land . . . [and] the
jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals” led A.V. Dicey to famously renounce administrative law as opposed to all English ideas and “unknown to English judges and counsel.”59 Defending administrative
law’s legitimacy against Dicey’s attack underlay Wyman’s distinction
of external administrative law—the law of the land, applicable to government officers as well as private citizens—from internal administrative law, as well as his insistence that external administrative law
trumped when in conflict with internal law.60 Indeed, the legitimacy
not just of administrative law but also of administrative governance
was at issue. Emphasizing the role of judicial review helped to portray
the expanding administrative state as compatible with constitutional
principles of checks and balances and divided government.61
Equally important were broader ideological commitments of the
time, in particular the Progressives’ deep skepticism of the courts and
LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
CHASE, supra note 37, at 20.
59 A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 193,
330 (10th ed. 1959).
60 WYMAN, supra note 43, at 4–13.
61 See JAFFE, supra note 57, at 320 (“The availability of judicial review is the necessary
condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to
be legitimate, or legally valid.”). As Merrill has noted, however, judicial review could be seen to
raise concerns of excessive judicial entanglement with the proper work of the political branches,
a concern alleviated by development of the appellate review model in this period. See Merrill,
supra note 37, at 992–1000.
57
58

R

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\83-4-5\GWN514.txt

unknown

Seq: 13

5-NOV-15

9:16

2015] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, & ACUS 1529

commitment to making professional expertise the basis of governmental decisionmaking rather than politics.62 This skepticism underlay enactment of administrative systems to replace common law rules and
was further reinforced by the ways courts impeded new administrative
regulation.63 The experience of the Lochner era made Frankfurter
and his fellow New Deal sympathizers deeply suspicious of the courts
and intent on curtailing their involvement in administrative policy
choices.64 Distinguishing internal administration from administrative
law served as a means of precluding judicial involvement in the former, even if it also served to reinforce the identification of administrative law with judicially enforced constraints. Emphasis on the need
for expert exercise of discretion for successful completion of governmental tasks, meanwhile, reinforced the inclination to limit judicial
involvement in the substance of administration.65 Early administrative law scholars disagreed fundamentally over whether administrative
discretion was a bane or a benefit: Freund viewed development of precise substantive rules, whether by legislatures or administrative superiors, to be inevitable and critical to preventing administrative abuse,
whereas Frankfurter embraced discretion as essential for effective administrative government.66 But, as even Freund acknowledged, courts
were ill-equipped to review questions of propriety, and thus an embrace of administrative discretion served to immunize areas of administrative action from judicial scrutiny.67
The progressive commitment to expert administration separate
from politics also led to the birth of the field of public administration.
Woodrow Wilson’s founding essay, The Study of Administration, insisted on the need to develop “the eminently practical science of ad62 See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC & ITS GOVERNMENT 157–58 (1930); Fenster,
supra note 39, at 80–86; Shapiro & Wright, supra note 31, at 597–98.
63

See, e.g., Schiller, supra note 55, at 403–04.

R
R

64 See CHASE, supra note 37, at 141–44; Schiller, supra note 55, at 407–14; Mark Tushnet,
Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court’s Accommodation of Progressive Legal
Theory, 60 DUKE L.J. 1565, 1591–92 (2011).

R

65 CHASE, supra note 37, at 12–17; Fenster, supra note 39, at 80–84; Schiller, supra note 55,
at 417–21; Tushnet, supra note 64, at 1571–73, 1584–86.

R
R

See FRANKFURTER, supra note 62, at 150–62; Ernst, supra note 41, at 173, 178–79, 185,

R

67 See Freund, supra note 41, at 419; see also MASHAW, supra note 1, at 301–08 (describing
the lack of judicial review of discretionary action as the longstanding norm before the twentieth
century); WYMAN, supra note 42, at 11, 16 (arguing discretion is not for judicial control). The
exception here is John Dickinson, who advocated the appellate review model, which allowed
courts to review even discretionary agency decisionmaking, albeit under a deferential standard
of review. Merrill, supra note 37, at 963, 971–76, 994–95, 997–1000, 1002.

R

66

187.
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ministration.”68 Although Wilson is famous for insisting on a
distinction between administration and politics, he also distinguished
administration and law, bemoaning undue attention to the questions
of lawmaking and constitutional framing at the expense of law implementation.69 And, he defined the object of administration in decidedly nonlegal, policy laden terms—as being “to discover, first, what
government can properly and successfully do, and, secondly, how it
can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at
the least possible cost either of money or of energy.”70 Leonard
White, author of the first public administration textbook in 1926, argued that “the study of administration should start from the base of
management rather than the foundation of law.”71 Here, too, exclusion of law was intended to protect administrative exercise of discretion from judicial interference and the restrictions of a rule-bound
approach.72
Public administration’s efforts to differentiate itself from law underscores yet another force behind the exclusion of administration
from administrative law: good old-fashioned turf protection, on the
part of lawyers and public administration scholars alike. Defining administrative law in terms of external judicial controls made it centrally
an arena for those with legal training and expertise, and thus preserved a new field for legal dominance.73 At the same time, pulling
administration out of law’s ambit was central to justifying the existence of new schools of public administration and of public administration as a distinct field of inquiry.74 Yet it merits emphasis that some
founding figures in the field of public administration took an opposite
approach and underscored its connection to administrative law.75 Perhaps not surprisingly, two leading examples were Frank Goodnow and
68

Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 197 (1887).

69

Id. at 198–200, 205–06, 211–12.

70

Id. at 197.

LEONARD D. WHITE, INTRODUCTION
(1926); Lynn, supra note 33, at 806.
71

TO THE

STUDY

OF

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION vii

See, e.g., JOHN M. PFIFFNER, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 18 (1935); Marshall E. Dimock,
The Meaning and Scope of Public Administration, in JOHN M. GAUS ET AL., THE FRONTIERS OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1, 6–7 (1936); Lynn, supra note 33, at 806.

R

72

R

73

CHASE, supra note 37, at 112–15, 134–35; Fenster, supra note 39, at 84–85.

R

74

CHASE, supra note 37, at 124–26; Lynn, supra note 33, at 808.

R

See Lynn, supra note 33, at 805 (identifying Goodnow and Freund as leading progenitors of public administration who recognized law’s importance to the field); see also Dimock,
supra note 72, at 6–12 (arguing for a synthesis between legal, institutional, and pragmatic or
experience-based approaches to public administration).
75

R
R
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Ernst Freund.76 They were joined by Marshall Dimock, who argued
for a closer association between administrative law, public administration, and political science, stating that “[p]ublic administration and administrative law are as inseparable as cause and effect.”77
By the public interest era of the 1960s and 1970s, progressive
faith in expert administration and broad discretion had become a relic
of the past, replaced by growing skepticism of agencies as captured by
regulated interests, unwilling to take seriously new public interest legislation, and ineffectual regulators to boot. On this skeptical view,
court oversight emerged as a critical check on unaccountable and arbitrary administration. Prime evidence of the courts’ centrality was
their expansion of the APA’s rulemaking requirements and development of searching “hard look review” to replace the deferential “arbitrary and capricious scrutiny” of the APA’s early years. The
identification of administrative law with judicial review was then
complete.
C. Contemporary Contributing Forces
This history explains why administrative law and internal administration initially diverged, but not why that divergence continues today. This ongoing divide is perplexing given the resultant
contemporary criticisms of administrative law as out of touch with actual administrative practice.78 Even more pointed are efforts by scholars to demonstrate the existence and significance of internal
administrative law. A seminal force here is Jerry Mashaw, whose recent book Creating the Administrative Constitution demonstrates internal administrative law’s longstanding pedigree.79 Others have
analyzed the importance of institutional design to how agencies operate, and for decades both constitutional and administrative scholars
have emphasized the centrality of internal executive branch oversight
for agency accountability.80 Events in the world have reinforced this
emphasis on internal administration. Perhaps no sphere demonstrates
Lynn, supra note 33, at 805.
Marshall E. Dimock, The Development of American Administrative Law, 15 J. COMP.
LEGIS. & INT’L L., no. 3, 1933, at 35, 35. Dimock also cautioned against only approaching public
administration through a legal lens, arguing that such an lens had ignored “methods, concrete
experiences, and, generally speaking, the human side of administration” in favor of a focus on
“judicial rules and decisions” as well as “statutory and constitutional limitations and requirements.” Dimock, supra note 72, at 6.
78 See supra text accompanying notes 23–32.
79 See MASHAW, supra note 1, at 4–5, 12.
80 See supra notes 5, 13–14 and accompanying text.
76

R

77
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the centrality of internal administration more than national security,
where limited judicial review combined with substantially expanded
governmental activity after 9/11 has brought public attention repeatedly to the role of internal controls.81
To some extent, the continuing divide between administrative law
and internal administration stems from the same forces that underlay
the divide’s initial creation. One major factor is skepticism about the
value of judicial review. This skepticism reflects concerns about the
courts’ ability to understand the complexity involved in regulatory
choices, as well as about judicial political biases, and is further fueled
by claims that the heightened judicial scrutiny born during the public
interest era has severely hampered agencies’ ability to function.82 The
shift in emphasis to centralized oversight and accountability through
the President stems in part from this judicial skepticism,83 and thus it
is perhaps not surprising that such internal executive branch controls
do not surface in judicial decisions. Nor, moreover, has the executive
branch encouraged a melding of presidential oversight with judicial
review, prominently declaring that key executive branch constraints
such as the requirements for centralized regulatory review are not judicially enforceable.84
Another contributing factor is the continued image of law as rules
and constraints that are externally imposed. There is a circularity
here—internal administration is excluded from the ambit of administrative law because internal administrative features and processes are
not seen as law. But nonetheless this image of law as externally binding rules—an image reinforced by the now lengthy period during
which internal administration and administrative law have been separated—continues to stand as an obstacle to bringing internal adminis81 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2322 & n.21, 2333 (2006); Shirin Sinnar,
Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 1027, 1046–47 (2013).
82 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative
Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1019–57 (2000); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 765–69 (2008); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L.
REV. 61, 63–64, 70–84 (1997); Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on
Agency Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1752–56,
1771–73 (2012).
83 See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1039, 1074–83 (1997).
84 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 10, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 88–92 (2012).
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tration within administrative law’s ambit.85 Both characteristics—law
as external constraints and law as rules—also explain the resistance to
seeing centralized executive branch controls or congressional oversight processes other than statutes as law instead of politics.86 Meanwhile, public administration’s turn towards greater managerialism,
relying on general management and organizational principles drawn
from fields of business and private organizations, makes efforts to inject the distinctly public accountability concerns of administrative law
appear anachronistic.87
Constitutional separation of powers concerns represent a final—
and today perhaps most significant—force behind preserving the administrative law and public administration divide.88 The Supreme
Court often justifies its refusal to address systematic administrative
features and processes on the grounds that to do so would be to overstep the judicial role.89 As Justice Scalia put the point in National
Wildlife Foundation, individuals “cannot seek wholesale improvement
of [a] program by court decree, rather than in the offices of the Department or the halls of Congress, where programmatic improvements
are normally made.”90 In institutional reform cases the Court has
sung a similar refrain, insisting that “it is not the role of courts, but
that of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government
in such fashion as to comply with the laws and the Constitution.”91
Separation of powers also animated the early reluctance to bring internal agency operations within administrative law’s embrace.92 But
the concerns then went more to the constitutional propriety of having
courts regularly review administrative actions on direct appeal, as opposed to only through the narrow prerogative writs or common law
85

See MASHAW, supra note 1, at 280–81.

R

Compare ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 14–15 (2010) (arguing that constraints come from politics and public opinion, not law), with Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381,
1406–08 (2012) (reviewing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra) (arguing that Presidents have strategic
reasons for complying with law other than merely being constrained by politics and public opinion). See also Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice,
and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1112–28 (2013) (describing skepticism about
whether presidential constraints represent law and analyzing the meaning of legal constraint).
86

See Lynn, supra note 33, at 806–07; see also Moe & Gilmour, supra note 36, at 136,

R

88

See MASHAW, supra note 1, at 303.

R

89

See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 891, 894 (1990).

90

Id. at 891.

91

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).

92

See Merrill, supra note 37, at 945.

87

142–43.
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actions.93 Moreover, as Tom Merrill has noted, the constitutionality of
such appellate review was generally accepted during the early decades
of the twentieth century, leaving pragmatic and political concerns to
animate resistance to judicial interference in areas of administrative
deference.94
II.

BRIDGING THE DIVIDE: THE ROLE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE

OF THE

Identifying the disconnect between administrative law and public
administration raises two difficult questions. The first is a normative
one: Should administrative law and public administration be more
closely linked, or would it be preferable to preserve the current divide? The second follows on the first: If closer linkage is desirable,
how is it best achieved?
A. The Arguments for Closer Linkage
Whether to bridge the current divide between administrative law
and public administration is a close question. The divide’s longstanding character suggests caution before casting it aside.95 In particular,
good reason exists to resist greater judicial involvement in administration, given concerns that judicial review already inhibits effective administration and creates poor incentives for agencies. Nonetheless, as
I have argued at length elsewhere, strong arguments exist for tying
administrative law and public administration more closely together.96
Perhaps the most basic argument in favor derives from the purpose of administrative law. Administrative law aims both to empower
and constrain agencies, to ensure effective government as well as preserve accountability and prevent arbitrary rule through requirements
of authorization, participation, transparency, and reasoned decisionmaking.97 If administrative law is increasingly divorced from the realities of governmental functioning, it is less able to perform either role.
For example, the risk that courts will intrude excessively into agencies’
operations if they consider broader, systemic processes needs to be
See MASHAW, supra note 1, at 302–03; see also Merrill, supra note 37, at 996–98.
See Merrill, supra note 37, at 965.
95 See supra Part I.A–B (discussing history of divide between administrative law and public administration).
96 See generally Metzger, supra note 10.
97 See MASHAW, supra note 1, at 280–81; Farber & O’Connell, supra note 16, at 1140.
Frankfurter put well this dual responsibility of administrative law: “Nothing less is our task than
fashioning instruments and processes at once adequate for social needs and the protection of
individual freedom.” Frankfurter, supra note 50, at 617.
93
94
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balanced against the ways that courts may impede agencies’ operations by not considering those processes. Having a court review the
legality of a proposed plan or planning process may prove less burdensome for the agency than waiting until the agency has adopted the
plan and implemented it, when reversal entails opening up a number
of specific applications.98 Moreover, that the main drivers of administrative action fall outside of administrative law’s ambit undermines
the legitimacy of administrative decisionmaking.99 Farber and
O’Connell put this point well: “The risk is that administrative law will
serve a primarily ceremonial purpose, providing the appearance, but
not the reality, of public participation and accountability in policymaking. In our view, the goals of transparency, participation, and
accountability are worth continued effort to strengthen them . . . .”100
The danger is not simply that the core aims of administrative law
will not be realized, but also that the actual ways in which administrative government is constrained and strengthened will not be recognized. This raises the danger that an effective source of administrative
reform will be ignored. As Mashaw argues,
[t]o the extent that we are interested in the reform of administrative law in the United States, we might do better to operate on the internal law of administration than by
ceaselessly tweaking the external law. For many, if not most,
agency functions remain structured primarily by agency regulations and internal directives.101
Worse, such lack of recognition may lead to evisceration of those
features that may be critical to effective and accountable administration. Shapiro makes this point with respect to expertise, arguing that
administrative law’s failure to understand administration has led to a
displacement and deterioration of expertise and a crowding out of
civil servants’ public service and professional instincts.102 Moreover,
the evisceration of internal administration also debilitates external
controls, for as Mashaw notes, “[w]ithout internal administrative law,
contemporary external accountability via political oversight and direction and judicial review could not operate.”103 It is internal administration—systemic mechanisms for planning, priority-setting,
98
99
100
101
102
103

See Cross, supra note 82, at 1022–25.
See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 16, at 1178–79.
Id. at 1178.
MASHAW, supra note 1, at 313.
See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 11; Shapiro &Wright, supra note 31, at 578, 609–17.
MASHAW, supra note 1, at 281–82.
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policymaking, resource allocation, and managerial oversight and supervision—that ensures agencies implement the statutes and instructions that their political and legal overseers give them and allows
those overseers to hold agencies to account when they fail to do so.104
Recognition of the central role internal administration plays in
achieving effective and accountable exercise of governmental power
also reveals the weakness in the separation of powers insistence on
excluding administration from constitutional and administrative law.
As I have argued, built into our constitutional system is an emphasis
on internal supervision of delegated governmental power. This means
that separation of powers analysis cannot be limited to ensuring that
courts do not exceed their proper purview. It also must include ensuring that the executive branch adheres to the constitutional duty to supervise, which in turn requires consideration of internal
administration. Significantly, this does not necessitate judicial policing of internal policing so much as an acknowledgement of the constitutional and legal role that internal administration plays.105
B. ACUS’s Bridging Function
An important variable to consider is the means by which administrative law and administration could be more closely linked. One option would be to have courts take administration more into account in
undertaking judicial review and framing administrative law doctrines.
Although such a judicial approach has potential, it also risks the kind
of significant judicial limitation of administrative operational discretion that progressive and New Deal administrative lawyers most
feared.106
Enter the Administrative Conference. ACUS is often praised for
the way that it combines governmental and private perspectives, with
a membership that spans agency officials, leading representatives of
the private and nonprofit regulatory bar, and administrative law scholars.107 Less appreciated is the way that ACUS simultaneously brings
See id.; Metzger, supra note 10, at 1892–94.
See Metzger, supra note 10, at 1843–44.
106 See id. at 1917–32.
107 ACUS’s authorizing statute specifies that ACUS will consist of 75–101 members, including a representative from each independent and executive agency and up to 40 public members
chosen by the Chair, with the requirement that public members “may at no time be less than
one-third nor more than two-fifths of the total number of members.” 5 U.S.C. § 593(a),
(b)(2)–(3), (b)(6) (2012). Public members are to be “members of the practicing bar, scholars in
the field of administrative law or government, or others specially informed by knowledge and
experience with respect to Federal administrative procedure.” Id. § 593(b)(6); see also Gary J.
104
105
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together the worlds of administration and administrative law. The
governmental members of ACUS are often top agency lawyers, but
they are also high-level agency officials who are intimately involved
with the wholly internal life of agencies. By contrast, ACUS’s nongovernmental members (perhaps confusingly denominated public
members) overwhelmingly come from administrative law backgrounds and are deeply engaged with the external dimensions of the
administrative state.108
ACUS’s projects also span the administrative law-public administration divide and stand out in particular for their emphasis on internal agency functioning.109 One manifestation of this emphasis is the
effort of ACUS to develop agency best practices, which aim to encourage administrative self-regulation and internal controls.110 This
emphasis is also clear from the subject matter of ACUS reports, statements, and recommendations, which in recent years have addressed
issues such as how agencies consider science, interagency coordination, governmental performance assessment, and the practice of centralized regulatory review.111 The net effect of ACUS’s membership
and committee structure is to yield a number of opportunities for
agency administrators and external administrative law experts to
closely debate specific features of internal agency operations.112 Al-

Edles, The Continuing Need for an Administrative Conference, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 111–14
(1998) (describing ACUS membership and describing ACUS “as a partnership of the public and
private sectors, but with a distinctly governmental flavor”).
108 See Edles, supra note 107, at 113–14 (“Economists, public administrators, and other
non-lawyers were occasionally named as members, but lawyers clearly dominated the membership.”); Gary J. Edles, The Revival of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 12 TEX.
TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 281, 289–90 (2011) (stating that most ACUS public members are lawyers but
noting then-existing exceptions). A list of ACUS’s public members is available at Public Members Roster, ADMIN. CONF. U.S., http://www.acus.gov/directory/public-member (last visited June
10, 2015).

R

109 See ACUS Recommendation 2013-3: Science in the Administrative Process, 78 Fed.
Reg. 41,357, 41,357–58 (July 10, 2013) (identifying internal practices that agencies may adopt to
promote transparency in the use of scientific techniques).
110 See id. (encouraging agencies to share best practices with other agencies to aid in development of the overall goal of transparency in scientific decisions).
111 See, e.g., id. ACUS Recommendation 2013-7: GPRA Modernization Act of 2010: Examining Constraints To, and Providing Tools For, Cross-Agency Collaboration, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,273
(Dec. 17, 2013); ACUS Statement 18: Improving the Timeliness of OIRA Regulatory Review, 78
Fed. Reg. 76,275 (Dec. 17, 2013); ACUS Recommendation 2012-5: Improving Coordination of
Related Agency Responsibilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,810 (Aug. 10, 2012).
112 See Edles, supra note 108, at 292 (recognizing the existing ACUS statute allows for
membership and structure to deal with management issues within agencies).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\83-4-5\GWN514.txt

1538

unknown

Seq: 22

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

5-NOV-15

9:16

[Vol. 83:1517

though ACUS also considers issues relating to judicial review, internal
administration and agency processes are its dominant concerns.113
ACUS’s focus on agency administration and process is hardly coincidental. ACUS is the modern incarnation of the famous Attorney
General’s Committee whose detailed study of actual agency processes
underlies the development of the APA.114 The APA did not create a
permanent body to undertake ongoing study of administrative procedure,115 but regular calls were made for such an entity, and presidents
periodically convened committees to study administrative process on
an ad hoc basis.116 These efforts culminated in the birth of ACUS in
the Administrative Conference Act of 1964.117 That ACUS inherited
the Attorney General’s Committee’s mantle and focus on how agencies operate is evident from its leading statutory mandate:
[T]o provide suitable arrangements through which Federal
agencies, assisted by outside experts, may cooperatively
study mutual problems, exchange information, and develop
recommendations for action . . . to the end that private rights
may be fully protected and regulatory activities and other
Federal responsibilities may be carried out expeditiously in
the public interest.118
But ACUS’s statutory mandate also makes clear its bridging function, as it also instructs ACUS to focus on the more external dimensions of the administrative state by improving the effectiveness and
efficiency of public participation in, and the laws governing, the regulatory process, as well as reducing unnecessary litigation.119
113 See id. (describing ACUS as a “Conference plus” organization that combines legal and
management issues).
114 See Gellhorn, supra note 3, at 226 (“The Final Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure and the investigations that preceded it set the stage for the
federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 . . . .”).
115 See Marshall J. Breger, The Administrative Conference of the United States: A Quarter
Century Perspective, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 813, 814 (1992) (“[I]t soon became apparent that the
APA had not settled all outstanding issues in administrative procedure.”).
116 Id. (“[T]wo Presidents as well as the Judicial Conference appointed temporary entities
to perform this function [of reviewing and recommending improvements in agency
procedures].”).
117 See id. at 814–18.
118 5 U.S.C. § 591(1) (2012); see also id. § 591(4) (listing improving agency use of science in
regulatory process as an additional purpose of the statute); id. § 594(1) (authorizing ACUS to
carry out these purposes by “study[ing] the efficiency, adequacy, and fairness of the administrative procedure used by administrative agencies in carrying out administrative programs, and
mak[ing] recommendations . . . .”).
119 Id. § 591(2)–(3), (5); see also Edles, supra note 108, at 292 (arguing that public management concerns fit within the revived ACUS’s statutory mandate).
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ACUS thus is already a rare and important exception to the separation of administrative law and public administration. Yet ACUS
could also do more to link these fields together. ACUS should study
more directly how the worlds of administrative law and public administration interact. ACUS should also undertake projects that target
aspects of administrative operation more familiar to public administration scholars than administrative lawyers—such as federal personnel systems, agency mechanisms for priority-setting, or internal
administrative supervision and management structures. Although less
immediately tied to specific agency regulatory processes, such background features profoundly impact how successful these processes ultimately are. ACUS could also become a venue for suggesting ways to
incorporate public administration more into administrative law doctrines and judicial review, drawing on its membership’s expertise to
identify ways that courts could take internal organizational features
into account while still preserving agency discretion and managerial
flexibility. Finally, ACUS could include more policy and public administration experts to complement the administrative law emphasis
among its public members.120
Happily, a basis exists to think that ACUS may move more in this
direction. As part of a 1998 symposium, a leading administrative law
scholar envisioned a broader role for a revived ACUS, one that would
link administrative law and public administration: “The ‘new’ Conference . . . could become a mechanism to connect legal procedures to
the management issues that underlie them. The artificial distinction
between legal and management process should give way to a unified
concept of public management.”121 That scholar was the first chair of
the revived ACUS, Paul Verkuil.

120 See Edles, supra note 108, at 288–90, 293 (listing current members who specialize in
public administration and arguing that such individuals fit the statutory criteria for public members); Paul R. Verkuil, Speculating About the Next “Administrative Conference”: Connecting
Public Management to the Legal Process, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 187, 200–01 (1998) (urging that a new
entity focused not just on agency legal procedures but more broadly on management should be
dominated by policy analysts rather than lawyers).
121 Verkuil, supra note 120, at 187. Others also faulted the original ACUS for failing “to
develop well-planned programs for the systematic in-depth study of, and important improvement
in, the federal bureaucracy” or undertake “detailed studies of how, or how well, these agencies
perform their respective functions in general.” Glen O. Robinson, The Administrative Conference and Administrative Law Scholarship, 26 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 270, 272 (1974); see also Breger, supra note 117, at 840 (agreeing with Robinson that the ACUS should undertake detailed
studies of agency performance).
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